Account of Napoleon’s Mobile Defense

Meanwhile, in Germany, the Austrians, led by General Moreau, were steadily countering the main French offensive. Once the French army was pushed back to the West Bank of the Rhine, the Austrians could shift their main focus to Napoleon’s army in Italy. Napoleon, after fighting numerous battles in quick succession, was in desperate need of reinforcement. By the end of October, the French army in Italy stood at 41,400 men, many of whom were sick or injured. The Austrians were regrouping to the north. With Würmser’s forces still in Mantova, Bonaparte was left with no choice but to maintain a defensive position between the two armies. Without knowing which way the Austrians would advance from the north, Napoleon ordered his division commanders to secure the various routes. Vaubois’ division of 10,000 men was sent north of Trento to block any advances from the north. Massena was sent to set up a defense at Bassano, while Kilmaine replaced a sick Sérurier in the siege of Mantova. Augereau was placed in central reserve, ready to be moved wherever necessary.

At the beginning of November, the Austrian army, 46,000 strong, was now under the command of Baron d’Alvintzi. Alvintzi devised another two-pronged attack, with his army advancing from the east and Davidovitch’s army advancing from the north. Alvintzi’s goal was to deceive Bonaparte into believing that his army was the main force. Napoleon was confused for a brief time as he initially ordered Vaubois to attack the Austrians to the north. By the 5th of November, Bonaparte realized that Davidovitch’s army was larger than he had first anticipated and ordered Vaubois to go on the defensive, hold his position, and not allow the Austrians to get to the south of Lake Garda.

The forces under Massena and Augereau were steadily beaten back and Napoleon had them fall back to the Adige River. Napoleon also ordered Joubert, garrisoned in Rovigo, to march to Rivoli to provide assistance to Vaubois. Alvintzi, instead of advancing to Mantova, decided to attempt to join forces with Davidovitch. A series of minor attacks from both sides were ineffective leaving the French army in Verona facing the Austrian army in Caldiero. Napoleon was at a numerical disadvantage and needed a plan that would even the odds between the two armies.

Sources:
Chandler, David G. (1966). The Campaigns of Napoleon. New York: MacMillan
Publishing Co., Inc.

Britt, Albert Sydney (1986). Atlas for Wars of Napoleon. Wayne, N.J. : Avery Publishing Group.