Account of the Battle of Arcola

Napoleon’s plan of attack against Alvintzi was a revision of the ‘attacking from the rear’ tactic he had used against Beaulieu at Lodi and Würmser at Bassano. Napoleon felt that if all but a skeleton force of his troops defending Verona could assault Villa Nova, using the Adige to cover their movements, they could capture the Austrian convoys and secure the French army’s west flank. Alvintzi would then have to forgo his attack on Verona and fight the French army in an area of marshland situated between two rivers, the Adige and the Alpone. This would eliminate his numerical superiority against the French. The key to French success would be the speed at which Napoleon’s plan could be implemented before the Austrians reacted.

Napoleon left Verona for Villa Nova on the 14th with 18,000 men. By the 15th, the French army was crossing the Adige River at three different points, moving into the marshlands. Once across, Massena quickly secured the west flank of the French army by seizing the village of Porcile to the northwest, just west of Verona. Augereau did not have the same fortune as he attempted to secure the east flank, which would have allowed the French to attack the Austrians from the rear. Heavy resistance from the Austrians, with the help of Croatian forces, stopped Augereau from crossing the Alpone and gaining access to Arcola. Napoleon’s forces could not secure Arcola and Villa Nova by the time that Alvintzi’s forces moved into the area on the evening of the 15th.

To the north of the Battle of Arcola, along the east side of Lake Garda, the French forces under Joubert had been steadily pushed back to Bussolengo, a few kilometers south of Rivoli, by Davidovitch’s forces. Napoleon, taking no chances, pulled all of his men behind the Adige River during the evening of the 15th in anticipation of a possible rescue mission northward to help Joubert’s forces.

The 16th the French forces were fighting for control of Porcile and Arcola once again. By the end of the day, Porcile was once again under French control but Arcola remained under Austrian control. Though the Austrians were in control of the key positions in the area, the French army was inflicting heavy casualties and Alvintzi believed that his army could only withstand one more heavy attack from the French. On orders from Napoleon, General Kilmaine arrived the night of the 16th with 3,000 reinforcements from Mantova.

As the morning of the 17th arrived with no further news from Joubert, Napoleon prepared for a third major attack on the Austrians. In the course of the last two days of battle, Alvintzi’s forces had been split into two unconnected columns. Napoleon could now deal with each Austrian column with numerical superiority. Massena’s division was ordered to attract the enemy’s attention within the marshes while Augereau’s division went for control of Arcola, crossing at Albaredo to the south.

With a clever ambush by Massena and trickery by Napoleon, who placed trumpeters to the east of the Austrians (signaling the arrival of a phantom French force), the Austrian forces to the south of Alvintzi’s main body believed that they were under heavy attack and retreated northward. The French army was then able to sweep through Arcola and onto the plain without further contest. b40_real.jpg (717557 bytes)  Alvintzi had no choice but to order his battered army to retreat north to Vicenza. With the Battle of Arcola over, Napoleon moved his forces back into Verona on the 18th and turned his attention to Davidovitch who was on the verge of defeating Joubert’s forces.

Augereau’s division moved up along the left bank of the Adige hoping to envelop the enemy. The Austrian general, suddenly realizing his impending demise, quickly retreated north to Trento, leaving most of his equipment to the French. When Alvintzi learned of Davidovitch’s retreat he gave up on reaching Mantova and withdrew further north to regroup. Napoleon knew that there was another battle to be faced against the Austrians in the weeks to come and thus began to make preparations.

Sources:
Chandler, David G. (1966). The Campaigns of Napoleon. New York: MacMillan
Publishing Co., Inc.

Britt, Albert Sydney (1986). Atlas for Wars of Napoleon. Wayne, N.J. : Avery Publishing Group.