
On the 27th of March 1796, Napoleon Bonaparte took
command
of a beleaguered Army of Italy garrisoned along the coastline between Nice and
Savona. The French army had been in Italy since 1792 and their numbers were
dwindling daily as, demoralized by a lack of clothing, food, and wages, soldiers
deserted. Napoleon quickly prepared for his first campaign, knowing that his men
needed a rapid victory to boost their moral. He outlined his plan of attack to
his three divisional commanders, Sérurier, Augereau, and Massena. The aim was
to divide the Piedmont forces from the Austrian forces and force them into an
armistice.
Napoleon hoped to start the campaign on the 15th of April, and
moved his headquarters from Nice to Savona on the 9th in preparation for the
upcoming battle. He believed that the town of Carcare was the weak link joining
the two armies. If the French army could break this link and concentrate on
defeating General Colli’s Piedmontese army while holding off the Austrian
army, victory could be achieved.
General Beaulieu, commander of the Austrian army, descended upon French
forces garrisoned in Voltri on the 10th of April forcing Napoleon
into action four days early. Beaulieu’s advance obliged the French forces to
retreat southward along the coast but it also revealed the position of the
Austrian army.
On the 12th of April, two French divisions totaling 9,000 men
under the command of General La Harpe and General Massena, quickly moved in on
Austria’s General Argenteau and his 6,000 men in the Dego area. The French
swiftly decimated the Austrians leaving the Argenteau with only 700 men the
following day. With a stunned Austrian army to the east, Napoleon turned to make
his advance on General Colli to the west. Massena remained at Dego with half of
his division to hold off any further advance from the Austrians. Augereau’s
division, with the other half of Massena’s division moved in on Ceva. Sérurier
also moved his division north to Ceva, concentrating over 25,000 men against the
Piedmontese. Napoleon kept six battalions in reserve at Carcare.
Massena encountered another
sizeable Austrian force on the 13th but by the morning of the 14th he had taken
most of the 5,000 Austrian soldiers prisoner. Still, Napoleon worried that the
Austrians might come to the aid of the Piedmontese and spent the next couple of
days both regrouping his forces and trying to determine the extent of the
Austrian threat.
Having established that General Beaulieu was cautiously waiting in the
region around Acqui, Napoleon was free to focus his full attention on Colli’s
forces. However, by that time Colli had retreated to a more secure position at
the confluence of the Corsaglia and Tanaro rivers, just east of Mondovi.
Over the next few days Napoleon was unable to advance on the Piedmontese army.
On the 19th, he shifted his line of communications westward and weakened his
right flank as the Austrians were perceived to be a minor threat in the short
term.
As Napoleon prepared for another assault ordered for the 21st, Colli
withdrew his forces further to the west into the town of Mondovi. Napoleon, not
wanting to give Colli a chance to regroup, ordered Sérurier to advance. General
Bonaparte’s forces continued to advance upon Colli as his army retreated to
Turin. Napoleon, now in control of the plains of Piedmont, had achieved his
initial objective.
On the evening of the 23rd of April, General Colli requested
an armistice. Napoleon agreed to a ceasefire only two days later after he had
moved his division commanders into Cherasco and Alba, completing the separation
of the Piedmontese forces from the Austrian army. It had taken only ten days for
General Napoleon Bonaparte to bring the Piedmont region to its knees. However,
there was to be no rest for the French army as Napoleon ordered his men to
follow Beaulieu’s forces onto the Po valley.
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Sources:
Chandler, David G. (1966). The Campaigns of Napoleon. New York: MacMillan
Publishing Co., Inc.
Britt, Albert Sydney (1986). Atlas for Wars of Napoleon. Wayne, N.J. : Avery Publishing Group.